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I
n addition to causing financial and social hardship to families and individuals, high 
foreclosure rates can have negative effects on neighborhoods, cities, and metropolitan 
regions. One key concern among policymakers and community developers is the extent 
to which lender-owned homes, often called real estate owned or REO properties, accu-
mulate in different local housing markets. The neighborhood and community impacts of 
foreclosure are expected to be worse if foreclosed properties sit vacant for significant periods 
of time and are not absorbed back into the market in some productive way. The inventory 
of REO properties in a local housing market or submarket may become not just a symptom 
of housing market decline but an impediment to recovery. An increasing amount of REO 
inventory in a local or regional housing market may discourage price stabilization and the 
return of even moderate levels of home purchase activity and financing. 
A related reason for concern over the accumulation and aging of REO in a local market 
involves the negative effects of spatially concentrated vacant homes, especially if their phys-
ical condition deteriorates.3 If REOs are disproportionately concentrated in some neighbor-
hoods, and if some of these properties fall into disrepair or become blighted or vandalized, 
they may have particularly strong negative impacts on these neighborhoods.4 One particular 
sign of potential problem REO properties are those properties that have been held by banks 
for more than a few months. Thus it is important to examine the aging of REO invento-
ry—the length of time that properties have been owned by the lender.
1  This paper first appeared at a Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Community Affairs Discussion Paper 02-08.
2  The author thanks Kris Gerardi, Todd Greene, Karen Leone de Nie, Brian Mikelbank, Roberto Quercia, and 
Geoff Smith for comments on an earlier version of this paper. All errors, omissions, and opinions remain 
solely the author’s responsibility. The views expressed here are the author’s and not necessarily those of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System. Comments to the author are welcome at 
daniel.immergluck@atl.frb.org.
3  Not all REO properties are vacant, or vacant during the entire REO period. Non-owner-occupied rental prop-
erties that go into foreclosure, particularly in states with tenant protection laws, may be particularly likely to 
be occupied during some or all of the REO period. On the other hand, in most states, lenders are able to evict 
tenants fairly quickly after taking possession of a foreclosed property.
4  It is important to point out that just because a property “exits” from REO inventory does not necessarily 
mean that the property has been returned to some productive use that is beneficial to a community. Properties 
may continue to sit vacant or may be purchased by “bottom feeders” who may not rehabilitate dilapidated 
properties, etc. In the longer term, properties may even become tax-delinquent and abandoned. The analysis 
in this paper does not address the nature or disposition of the property after it exits REO status. See Coulton, 
Schramm and Hirsh (2008) for an excellent analysis of post-REO properties in the Cleveland area.Although they pose many challenges, REO properties can also present opportunities 
for community developers and policymakers to turn the homes into a source of long-term 
affordable housing or provide opportunities for other forms of redevelopment by providing 
relatively low-cost land and building stock. The growth and concentration of REO proper-
ties in various neighborhoods and cities has prompted a variety of policy and programmatic 
responses, first by many local governments and nonprofits and more recently at the federal 
level with the advent of the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP). The NSP, which 
was authorized in the 2008 Housing and Economic Recovery Act, provides $3.92 billion in 
funding over 18 months to state and local governments for neighborhood recovery from 
foreclosures.5 NSP funds can be used for a variety of purposes related to neighborhood 
stabilization, including the purchase and redevelopment of foreclosed properties by govern-
mental or quasi-governmental entities such as land banks, the demolition of such properties, 
or the financing of home-purchase activity.
Despite the attention and policy response aimed at the problems of vacant, foreclosed 
homes, data on REO properties in the United States are generally quite scarce, especially in 
a form that is highly comparable across different localities or regions. In this article I seek to 
describe the spatial distribution of REO properties across U.S. metropolitan areas. I examine 
the growth of REO inventory, with particular attention to REO trajectories, in a set of thir-
teen large metro areas with relatively high levels of REO activity. I also look at the aging of 
recent REO inventory. That is, I examine the extent to which REO properties have been in 
REO for more than a few months, as well as those held for over one year. The purpose of 
this aging analysis is to determine whether some metro areas with large numbers of REO may 
be experiencing only high levels of “frictional” or short-term REO, in which properties are 
sold within a few months, but not numerous properties that stay in REO for longer periods. 
Conceivably, some metro areas experiencing very high foreclosure rates may also see proper-
ties go into and out of REO very quickly. Such properties might be expected to have less 
deleterious impacts on neighborhoods than those remaining in REO—and likely vacant—for 
longer periods of time. Finally, I use cluster analysis to identify similar groups of MSAs using 
initial levels of REO inventory and changes in house-price appreciation.
This article is intended to be a first look at REO inventory trajectories during the most 
recent mortgage crisis cycle of 2007 and 2008. To do this, I examine data from August 2006 
to August 2008. The analysis is not exhaustive. Given the fast-moving nature of foreclosure 
problems in recent years, following up this work with additional research will be important.
One limitation of this article is that its analysis is at the level of metropolitan statistical 
areas (MSAs). The MSA is a common, but quite large, geographical level of housing market 
hierarchy. Some smaller MSAs may approach a notion of a fairly unified, unsegmented 
housing market. In most large MSAs, however, there can be many geographic submarkets 
that are somewhat distinct from one another. In such metro areas, there may be both areas 
5  For more detail on the Neighborhood Stabilization Program see Mallach (2008). 
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with little REO activity and other areas with substantial REO activity. Notwithstanding these 
submarket variations, MSAs represent a common notion of regional housing markets, and 
their use captures the very substantial regional differences in REO trajectories and compo-
sition. My intent in the future is to scope down in several high-REO metropolitan areas to 
examine submetropolitan patterns of REO to understand which parts of these metro areas 
have experienced the greatest buildup of REO and to explore the aging of REO in such places. 
But that will need to wait for a subsequent article.
Data on REO Properties—from Local to National
Although researchers have increasingly focused their attention on foreclosure-related 
issues in recent years, the paucity of comprehensive, cross-market data on REO properties 
has made it difficult to gain a strong understanding of the REO problem since the advent 
of the 2007–2008 mortgage crisis. Data on foreclosures and post-foreclosure properties, such 
as REO, are not compiled on a regular, uniform basis by any public agency at a multistate 
level. Public real estate records can be used in many places to identify lender-owned proper-
ties, although the process can be quite labor intensive, and the quality and accessibility of 
such data vary across local jurisdictions (often counties). Some firms purchase or assemble 
local property records data and/or foreclosure notices or filings and compile them for resale. 
Again, however, due to variation in state law, state data systems, and local property records, 
the uniformity of these data can be quite limited. 
In any one locality or region, the best data on REO properties may well be local or state 
property records or private real estate listing data. Assuming these data are accessible, they 
can provide valuable information on REO properties. However, they may also be limited in 
that they may provide relatively little information concerning the nature of the financing 
related to the property before it was foreclosed upon (or assumed in some alternative to 
foreclosure). 
My objective is to compare trends in REO activity across metropolitan housing markets. 
Therefore, using local property records data is not practical. Instead, I use a private, large 
national database of mortgages, the Lender Processing Services Inc. (LPS) Applied Analytics 
data set (formerly referred to as the “McDash Analytics” data set), to describe REO buildup 
and aging across most metropolitan areas in the United States, with some special emphasis 
on a set of large metropolitan areas with relatively high levels of REO. 
The LPS data are compiled from mortgage servicing firms that collect mortgage payments 
for investors and lenders and handle the associated REO for these loans. By August 2008, 
nine of the top ten servicers and a total of sixteen firms provided data to LPS. The data 
set includes monthly information, including REO status, on more than 100 million loans, 
including more than 30 million loans that are currently active. Loans stay in the LPS data set 
through the REO process, making it useful for the purposes here. However, the data set does FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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not capture all mortgages, and it significantly underrepresents the subprime market.6 There-
fore, I have prepared a number of measures using weights based on comparing the LPS data 
to other information on the size and composition of the mortgage market. This approach 
and more information on the LPS data are described in more detail in the appendix.
A Cross-Sectional Look at REO Density across Metropolitan Areas, August 2008
I begin by calculating the number of prime/near-prime and subprime REO properties 
in the LPS database in August 2008 across 358 MSAs in the United States.7 This is done 
by identifying loans in REO status in the LPS database in that month. Subprime loans are 
identified in the data, allowing one to distinguish between prime/near-prime and subprime 
REO. These raw REO counts are then divided by the estimated number of “mortgageable 
properties” in the MSA in 2006. This denominator is estimated using the Census Bureau’s 
2006 American Community Survey. I will refer to the ratio of REO properties per 10,000 
mortgageable properties as “REO density.” The REO density measure has the advantage over 
a measure of REO as a share of outstanding loans because it indicates the prevalence of REO 
properties relative to single-family and condominium housing stock in the region. From 
a community development and neighborhood stabilization perspective, this is generally a 
preferred measure of REO inventory.
I present some analysis using the prime/near-prime and subprime REO densities calcu-
lated from the LPS data and American Community Survey data only. However, in order to 
obtain an estimate of total REO density for each MSA, and especially because the LPS data is 
estimated to cover a smaller portion of the subprime (versus prime/near-prime) market, I also 
provide and use estimates of “total REO.” I do this by adjusting the subprime and prime/
near-prime REO densities upward to reflect the estimated total markets (using industry esti-
mates of outstanding prime/near-prime and subprime loans) for each loan type and then 
summing these adjusted figures. The subprime and prime/near-prime REO densities calcu-
lated directly from LPS, which I call “unadjusted” densities, are adjusted upward by national 
scaling factors for prime/near-prime and subprime loans separately. (See the appendix for 
more details.) Because the estimates of total density depend on the adjustment factors used, 
an alternative set of adjustments was calculated using a different estimate of the total prime/
near-prime and subprime markets to test the sensitivity of my findings to adjustment factors. 
The results using the alternative adjustments (not shown here) do not differ substantially 
from the results provided below.
6  The LPS data also do not include REO properties owned by the Federal Housing Administration or other 
federal agencies.
7  The LPS data do not break out what are often called “Alt-A” loans from prime loans. These are sometimes 
termed “near-prime” loans. Alt-A loans include many loans made to borrowers who have relatively high credit 
scores but that have other features (e.g., limited or no documentation) that increase default risk. They are 
included here with prime loans. Although they represent a relatively small share of all prime/near-prime loans, 
they account for a disproportionate share of foreclosures and REO in this category.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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Table 1 lists the 50 MSAs with the largest estimated total REO density as of August 2008 
among 358 MSAs. It indicates the unadjusted prime/near-prime and subprime REO densities 
as well as the estimated total REO density. The table also indicates in bold the relatively large 
MSAs (those with more than 400,000 mortgageable properties) among these 50 high-REO 
MSAs. The estimated REO densities in these 50 MSAs generally range from just under 100 
to more than 500 REO properties per 10,000 mortgageable properties. It is important to keep 
in mind that the estimated total REO density is merely an estimate and may overestimate or 
underestimate the true level of REO properties. The key aim here is not to develop a highly 
accurate, definitive measure of REO activity but rather to develop strong relative measures 
of REO density across MSAs. The “estimated total REO” is used primarily to provide some 
general sense of the volume of total REO compared to mortgageable housing stock and to 
control roughly for the underrepresentation of subprime loans in the LPS data.
When examining measures of metropolitan REO density, it is important to keep in mind 
variations in MSA size. Smaller MSAs are often less heterogeneous in terms of housing stock 
and neighborhood types and so will tend to vary more in REO density. As a result, many 
of the MSAs with the highest REO densities are relatively modest in size, including the top 
three MSAs in Table 1—Merced, Stockton, and Modesto. Notwithstanding this limitation, it is 
apparent that some states and regions are disproportionately represented at the top of this 
list. Eight of the top ten MSAs are in California, and another is in Nevada. The remaining MSA 
in the top ten is the Detroit area.
Table 1.  50 MSAs with Highest Estimated REO Density, August 2008



















Merced, CA  175.4 71.1 524.8
Stockton, CA 158.7 60.6 463.0
Modesto, CA 132.9 64.3 430.0
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 125.3 45.0 356.7
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV 141.8 33.8 349.9
Vallejo-Fairfield, CA  95.6 41.1 293.3
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI 93.6 38.9 283.1
Madera, CA  84.7 42.5 278.6
Bakersfield, CA 86.4 39.5 272.5
Yuba City, CA  90.0 33.3 259.2
Salinas, CA 100.1 26.1 254.2
Sacramento-Arden-Arcade-Roseville, CA 79.2 31.9 236.3FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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Flint, MI  91.6 24.4 234.1
El Centro, CA 77.5 31.4 231.7
Jackson, MI   79.3 23.3 209.5
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ  72.2 26.8 208.1
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI  63.8 23.5 183.6
Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL 57.1 25.1 177.1
Lansing-East Lansing, MI 58.9 24.0 176.7
Fresno, CA 52.3 26.9 174.3
Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI 60.5 21.3 170.9
Greeley, CO 62.1 19.6 168.2
Battle Creek, MI 54.9 21.8 162.7
Muskegon-Norton Shores, MI 53.0 22.6 162.1
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 63.4 14.7 155.3
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA 53.9 18.7 151.5
Reno-Sparks, NV 55.9 15.0 143.2
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 46.5 19.6 141.5
Visalia-Porterville, CA 40.7 22.6 140.7
Naples-Marco Island, FL 46.6 19.1 139.8
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria,DC-VA-WV  50.6 16.7 139.4
Denver-Aurora, CO 51.9 14.6 135.0
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL 39.0 20.3 130.8
Ann Arbor, MI 50.3 13.7 129.6
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA 50.7 13.1 128.5
Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA 40.7 16.8 122.6
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA 44.7 14.4 122.0
Saginaw-Saginaw Township North, MI 47.8 12.5 121.5
Monroe, MI 44.3 14.3 121.2
Elkhart-Goshen, IN 40.5 15.2 117.2
Memphis, TN-AR-MS 36.4 16.6 114.8
Niles-Benton Harbor, MI 30.5 19.6 113.8
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Goleta, CA 43.4 12.2 113.2
Kalamazoo-Portage, MI 39.2 13.5 109.7
Winchester, VA-WV 38.1 13.6 108.4
Port St. Lucie-Fort Pierce, FL 34.3 14.2 103.4
Pueblo, CO 31.8 15.3 102.4
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 36.1 12.2 100.3
Bay City, MI 36.4 11.1 97.5
Data Source: Lender Processing Services Inc. (LPS) Applied Analytics
* “Mortgageable properties” is the estimated number of 1–4 unit-residential properties plus condominiums in 2006, 
based on American Community Survey data on housing units by structure. Total estimated REO based on adjust-
ments by national scale factors derived from estimates of the coverage of the LPS data of the total market. See 
appendix for more information.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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Besides the many smaller metro areas in California in Table 1, smaller MSAs in Michigan 
are well represented among the highest-REO metro areas, accounting for 12 of the top 50 
MSAs. At the same time, many large metropolitan areas rank high among all metro areas 
in REO density. Among the large MSAs in Table 1 are Riverside, Las Vegas, Detroit, Sacra-
mento, Phoenix, Minneapolis, San Diego, Washington, DC, Atlanta, Denver, Miami, Los 
Angeles, Memphis, San Francisco, and San Jose. 
Changes in Metropolitan REO Density, August 2006 to August 2008
A good deal of attention has been paid to the large increases in foreclosures since late 
2006 in many parts of the country. However, there have been fewer systematic examinations 
of changes in REO inventory—or the accumulation of REO properties—in different parts 
of the country. I now turn to examining the trajectories of REO accumulation (or, in a few 
cases, inventory decline) at the MSA level. I begin by looking at trends across all 358 MSAs 
and then scope down to a set of large MSAs with high REO densities.
In order to examine changes in REO density over time using the LPS data, it was neces-
sary to take into account the dynamic nature of the data set, which grew as more servicers 
entered the data set over time. To address the expanding sample, all analyses of changes over 
time in REO activity were conducted after excluding “well-seasoned” loans that entered the 
data set after August 2006. (“Well-seasoned” is defined here as seasoned for more than four 
months.) The appendix describes this process in more detail and examines the extent and the 
size of the excluded activity compared to overall activity in the data set.
While many factors might affect REO density in an MSA, one variable that is expected 
to be closely related to REO, most likely as both cause and effect, is home price appreciation 
in the region. First, property values can be tightly linked to foreclosure activity. A variety of 
research has pointed to the negative impact of foreclosures on nearby home values (Immer-
gluck and Smith 2006; Mikelbank 2008; Schuetz, Been, and Ellen 2008). Other research 
suggests that foreclosed properties will appreciate more slowly than other comparable prop-
erties (Pennington-Cross 2006). At the same time, declining home values, especially in the 
cases of highly leveraged borrowers, make it difficult for borrowers to refinance or sell their 
home to avoid foreclosure. Moreover, at least in the case of investor properties, declining 
values can make it more likely that a borrower will willingly default even if he or she can 
afford to continue making payments. Therefore, declining values are likely to spur increased 
foreclosures. A variety of research has found positive effects of declining home values on 
loan  default  and  foreclosure  (Danis  and  Pennington-Cross  2005;  Gerardi,  Shapiro,  and 
Willen 2008).
In  addition  to  the  positive  relationship  between  property  values  and  foreclosures, 
declining values may also be linked to the accumulation and duration of REO properties by 
affecting the “exit” of properties from REO status. In declining-value markets, REO may not 
be easily absorbed into the broader market as buyers retreat. Moreover, accumulating REO 
can put downward pressure on price. Until prices are thought to have stabilized, buyers may 
remain scarce. Hence, increasing REO and declining values can reinforce each other in a 
vicious cycle. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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Figure 1. Increase in Estimated Total REO Density* vs. Change in Housing Price Index, 
August 2006 to August 2008, by Metropolitan Statistical Area
Data sources: Federal Housing Finance Agency; Lender Processing Services Inc. (LPS) Applied Analytics 
*  Estimated total REO based on adjusting prime/near-prime and subprime REO upward based on differences in 
prime/near-prime and subprime volumes in LPS data set vs. Mortgage Bankers Association National Delinquency 
Survey. Excludes loans entering LPS after August 2006 *and* more than 4 months after origination (aged loans 
entering after August 2006). See appendix for more information on methods. 
Figure 1 plots the percentage-point change in the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight (OFHEO) house price index from the second quarter of 2006 to the second quarter 
of 2008 versus the increase in estimated total REO density from August 2006 to August 2008. 
A cubic bivariate regression line is also shown to illustrate the nonlinear relationship between 
the two variables. For most MSAs where house price appreciation (HPA) was positive, there 
was some increase in REO density over the two-year period, and any relationship between 
HPA and increase in REO density was slight. As HPA approaches zero and goes slightly 
negative, increases in REO density tend to grow. As HPA approaches a drop of 10 percent or FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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more over the two-year period, REO density grows more quickly. However, the dispersion of 
changes in REO density grows as HPA grows more negative. That is, among metro areas with 
similarly high rates of price decline, large differences often exist in how much REO density 
increased over the two-year period.
Figures 2 through 5 more closely examine the trajectories of REO accumulation in thir-
teen large MSAs with high levels of REO. These include eight MSAs that could be described 
as “formerly hot” housing markets, including Miami, Phoenix, San Francisco, Washington, 
DC, Riverside, San Diego, Sacramento, and Las Vegas. The remaining five metro area could 
be considered weak (Cleveland, Detroit) or relatively stable (Atlanta, Denver, and Minne-
apolis) markets. As expected during hot housing market conditions, the initial unadjusted 
subprime REO densities in the formerly hot MSAs in August 2006 were generally very low, 
well under five per 10,000 mortgageable properties. The weak or stable market MSAs gener-
ally began the study period at substantially higher subprime REO densities, on the order of 
five to fifteen per 10,000 mortgageable properties.
  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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Figure 2.  Increase in Unadjusted Subprime REO* Density, 

























































































































































































Data source: Lender Processing Services Inc. (LPS) Applied Analytics, American Community Survey 2006
* Excludes loans entering LPS after August 2006 *and* more than 4 months after origination (aged loans 
entering after August 2006). See appendix for more information on method.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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Figure 3. Increase in Unadjusted Prime/Near-Prime REO* Density,  
















































































































































































Data source: Lender Processing Services Inc. (LPS) Applied Analytics, American Community Survey 2006
* Excludes loans entering LPS after August 2006 *and* more than 4 months after origination (aged loans entering 
after August 2006). See appendix for more information on method.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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Figure 4.  Increase in Estimated Total REO* Density, Based on  
Adjusted Prime/Near-Prime and Subprime Densities,  
































































































































































































Data source: Lender Processing Services Inc. (LPS) Applied Analytics, American Community Survey 2006
* Estimated total REO based on adjusting prime/near-prime and subprime REO upward based on differences in 
prime/near-prime and subprime volumes in LPS data set vs. Mortgage Bankers Association National Delinquency 
Survey. Excludes loans entering LPS after August 2006 *and* more than 4 months after origination (aged loans 
entering after August 2006). See appendix for more information on methods.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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Figure 5.  Change in Share of Estimated REO that is Subprime,  























































































































































Data source: Lender Processing Services Inc. (LPS) Applied Analytics, American Community Survey 2006FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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Figure 2 illustrates the change in unadjusted subprime REO density for the thirteen 
MSAs. The top chart shows that San Francisco, Miami, Phoenix, Washington, DC, and San 
Diego have had similar subprime REO density trajectories, with strong increases over the 
two-year period. Meanwhile, REO density in Riverside, Sacramento, and Las Vegas MSAs 
grew even faster.
The bottom chart in Figure 2 shows that the Detroit MSA experienced a very large 
increase in subprime REO until the end of 2007, but then subprime inventory slowed and 
declined somewhat. The Denver area saw a steady increase in subprime REO until October 
2007, but since then it has seen a substantial decline. Although they did not experience the 
very steep increases in REO as the metro areas in the formerly hot markets in the top chart, 
the Minneapolis, Atlanta, and Cleveland MSAs also saw large increases in subprime REO 
over the study period. In some metro areas, the subprime REO density either slowed or even 
dipped slightly in August 2008, the last month of the analysis.
Figure 3 repeats the analysis in Figure 2, but for prime/near-prime loan REO density. 
Similar to the subprime findings, prime/near-prime REO density increased more in some 
metropolitan areas than others, with the greatest increases in the Las Vegas and Riverside 
MSAs, with somewhat smaller—but still very fast—growth in the other formerly hot-market 
MSAs in the top chart. Comparing the top chart in Figure 2 to the top chart in Figure 3 shows 
that prime/near-prime REO growth has generally lagged behind that of subprime REO, but 
by early 2008 prime/near-prime REO was, in some MSAs at least, accelerating and growing 
more quickly than subprime REO. Comparing the bottom chart in Figure 3 to the bottom 
chart in Figure 2 shows that prime/near-prime REO grew more steadily in the Detroit area.
Figure 4 plots the change in estimated total REO density from August 2006 to August 
2008. Again, due to the somewhat similar trajectories of prime/near-prime and subprime 
REO in formerly hot-market MSAs, the top chart of Figure 4 resembles those in Figures 2 
and 3. Riverside, Las Vegas, and Sacramento MSAs experienced the sharpest increases in 
estimated total REO, but increases were also quite large and steep in the other formerly hot-
market MSAs. The bottom chart in Figure 4 shows that, in the stable-weak-market MSAs, 
the estimated total REO generally grew quite steadily, with the Denver MSA experiencing 
a significant decline since late 2007. However, the increase in REO density in these metro-
politan areas was generally much less than in the formerly hot-market MSAs, so that by the 
end of the period the formerly hot-market MSAs tended to have similar or higher total REO 
densities than the stable-weak-market metro areas. The Detroit MSA remained among the 
large metropolitan areas with the highest estimated total REO density, but by the spring of 
2008 Riverside and Las Vegas had surpassed it in terms of estimated REO density. More-
over, by August 2008, Sacramento and Phoenix exceeded the REO densities of the Denver, 
Minneapolis, Atlanta, and Cleveland MSAs.
Figure 5 shows that the source of REO, in terms of prime/near-prime versus subprime 
loans,  shifted  significantly  across  most  MSAs  toward  prime/near-prime  and  away  from 
subprime loans, especially after late 2007. Whether an REO property is associated with a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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prime/near-prime or subprime loan may be important for various reasons. In particular, most 
subprime loans are held in complex securitized trusts, which can complicate the disposition 
and purchase of the properties. Prime/near-prime REO, compared to subprime REO, will 
more often be held by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac (either in their portfolios or as backing 
for GSE securities) or on the balance sheet of a lender. Therefore, one might expect that the 
disposition of many prime/near-prime REO properties might involve less complicated nego-
tiations and acquisitions. However, the Alt-A portion of the prime/near-prime REO is more 
likely to be held in a wide variety of disparate private-label securities, and so, like subprime 
REO, their disposition may be relatively more complex.
In some MSAs (Riverside, Sacramento, San Francisco, and Washington, DC), this shift 
began as early as August 2006, but in other MSAs, including most of the stable-weak-market 
metro areas, the decline in the subprime share of REO did not begin until late 2007. By 
August 2008, the share of REO that was associated with subprime loans had dropped below 
50 percent for all 13 of the MSAs, with the share dipping below 40 percent in 7 of the 13 
MSAs. Of course, within these and other MSAs, the distribution of prime/near-prime and 
subprime REO is likely to vary considerably. In particular, subprime REO are expected to 
be located more in lower-income and minority neighborhoods relative to prime/near-prime 
REO. Subprime REO might also be more clustered in various other types of locations within 
metropolitan regions. Further research is needed to examine these patterns.
REO Aging Across MSAs
The simple volume of REO inventory is not all that is of concern. We might be particu-
larly concerned with the volume of “old” REO, that is, the properties that entered REO 
status longer than a few months ago. In some markets, a high degree of “frictional” REO may 
be possible, that is, many properties entering and exiting REO status at any one time with 
relatively few properties staying in REO for more than a few months. Conversely, in some 
places many REO properties could be “stale,” that is, have been in REO status for more than 
a few months, or in more extreme cases for a year or more.
Figure 6 shows that, in metropolitan areas overall, approximately 50 percent of the REO 
in August 2008 was more than three months old. The distribution of prime/near-prime REO 
aging is a bit broader than for subprime REO, with a higher percentage of prime/near-prime 
REO being over twelve months old and a slightly higher percentage being sold in less than 
a month (zero months).
Measuring the frictional aspect of REO stock across different metropolitan markets is 
made a bit complicated by the fact that in some areas the portion of REO stock that entered 
REO fairly recently is quite large due to the more recent surge in foreclosure activity. There-
fore, rather than measuring the proportion of REO that is older (e.g., more than x months 
old), which will be heavily affected by the amount of recent REO flowing into the market, a 
better estimate is to measure the density of older REO in the region. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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Data source: Lender Processing Services Inc. (LPS) Applied Analytics
Figure 7 plots the combined density of “old” and “very old” REO, combined, by MSA. 
Old REO are defined here as those properties that have been in REO for four to twelve 
months. Very old REO are those that have been in REO for more than twelve months. 
Figure 8 plots the density of very old REO alone. The two maps are quite similar, suggesting 
that the MSA-level distributions of old and very old REO are at least roughly similar.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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Figure 7.  REO Aging: Old and Very Old REO per  
10,000 Mortgageable Properties 358 MSAs, August 2008
Figure 8.  REO Aging: Very Old REO per 10,000 Mortgageable Properties
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Figure 9.  Very Old versus Old REO Densities by Metropolitan Area, August 2008
Data sources: Lender Processing Services Inc. (LPS) Applied Analytics, American Community Survey 2006
Figure 9 extends a comparison of Figures 8 and 9 by plotting the density of very old REO 
against the density of old REO. In general, the plot shows a strong correlation between the 
two aging categories. Metropolitan areas with a high density of old REO also tend to have 
a high density of very old REO. However, many of the MSAs that have experienced very 
fast increases in REO since August 2006, including many in California, tend to lie on the 
lower/right of the dashed line. Although many of these MSAs have high rates of very old 
REO, their rates of old REO are particularly high. Conversely, in many of the MSAs where 
foreclosures and REO have been high for a longer period of time, the rate of very old REO 
is particularly large. 
However, it should be noted that even in some metro areas where the density of REO 
was small in late 2006, the density of very old REO has become quite large. In fact, of the 
ten MSAs with very old REO densities of more than 20 per 10,000 properties, three were 
housing markets in California (Merced, Stockton, and Riverside). Of the remaining seven, six 
are MSAs in Michigan, and the last is the Minneapolis–St. Paul–Bloomington MSA. There-
fore, although the stable-to-weak markets that have experienced high levels of foreclosure 
and REO for a longer period of time—well before 2007—tend to have the highest rates of very 
old REO, many formerly hot housing markets appear to be “catching up,” amassing a large 
amount of both old REO and very old REO.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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Cluster Analysis: A Typology of Metropolitan REO Markets
Given the relationship between home price appreciation and increases in REO density, I 
use cluster analysis to identify a typology of MSAs using the initial (August 2006) subprime 
REO density, the initial prime/near-prime REO density, and the change in the OFHEO 
home price index from the second quarter of 2006 to the second quarter of 2008. The 
cluster analysis results in three clusters described in Table 2 and illustrated in Figure 10. 
Metropolitan areas in the largest cluster, Cluster 1, are characterized by initial REO densities 
that are close to the median of all 358 MSAs. This cluster is also characterized as having a 
modest initial share of subprime REO (26.1 percent median) over the two-year period and a 
moderate level of home price appreciation (7.7 percent median versus the 358 MSA median 
of 5.8 percent).
Cluster 1 MSAs tend to be mostly modest in size (median number of mortgageable prop-
erties was 61,079). Finally, the median increase in estimated total REO density was relatively 
low at 8.31. This cluster, which I label “Low Initial REO Density and Stable Prices,” accounts 
for almost 65 percent of MSAs but less than 47 percent of the mortgageable properties in all 
of the MSAs.
The second cluster includes metropolitan areas with relatively high initial estimated 
REO densities. This includes many metropolitan areas in Michigan and other weak-market 
cities as well as some stable-market cities with relatively high foreclosure and REO levels in 
2006. Besides the Detroit MSA, this cluster includes the Minneapolis, Atlanta, Indianapolis, 
Memphis, and Denver MSAs. The MSAs in Cluster 2 are characterized by above-average 
initial subprime REO shares and modest home price appreciation or moderate declines in 
value. This cluster is labeled “High Initial REO Density.” It accounts for 16 percent of the 
MSAs but 22 percent of total MSA mortgageable properties.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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Table 2.  Cluster Analysis: MSAs Clustered by REO Prime/Near-Prime and




















Number of MSAs in Cluster 231 58 69 358
Number of MSAs in California in Cluster 0 0 26 26
Median Level of REO per 10,000 
Mortgageable Properties, 8/2006
11.08 36.76 2.78 10.81
Median Level of Subprime REO per 
10,000 Mortgageable Properties, 8/2006
2.92 11.98 1.44 3.21
Median Estimated Share of REO 
that is Subprime, 8/06
26.1% 35.0% 53.7% 29.8%
Median Increase in REO per 10,000 Mortgageable 
Properties, 8/06 - 8/08
8.31 23.01 64.83 12.70
Median Percentage Point Increase in OFHEO 
Housing Price Index, 2Q 2006 - 2Q 2008
7.7% 2.0% -12.2% 5.8%
Median Number of Mortgageable 
Properties, 2006
61,079 88,691 137,758 75,319
Total Number of Mortgageable 
Properties in Cluster MSAs, 2006
32,401,199 15,802,851 22,250,703 70,454,754
Note: Clustering process used Ward’s Method with squared Euclidean distance measure Community Development INVESTMENT REVIEW 27
Figure 10. Locations of MSAs by Cluster
Data sources: Lender Processing Services Inc. (LPS) Applied Analytics, American Community Survey 2006; 
Federal Housing Finance Agency
The third cluster includes mostly metropolitan areas that had very low REO densities 
initially (August 2006) and experienced significant loss in property values over the two-year 
period. It includes all of the California MSAs in the data set as well as most of the other 
formerly hot-market metropolitan areas, many of which have seen large increases in REO 
density. These metro areas began the period with very low REO densities (median 1.44 per 
10,000 properties) and high subprime REO shares (median of 53.7 percent). They were rela-
tively large with a median number of mortgageable properties of more than 130,000. This 
cluster accounted for 19 percent of MSAs but 31 percent of mortgageable properties in all 
358 MSAs. This cluster is labeled “Low Initial REO Density and Large Price Decline.”
Figure 11 plots the increase in estimated total REO density (August 2006–August 2008) 
against the initial estimated total REO density (August 2006), indicating cluster membership 
for each MSA. It shows that most of the MSAs in Cluster 2 (light solid) experienced sizeable 
increases in REO density and that, within this cluster, generally MSAs with higher initial 
REO densities tended to see larger increases in REO density. The outliers in this cluster are 
the Denver and Greeley MSAs, which had very high initial REO densities but saw relatively 
moderate increases in REO density over the two-year period.
Cluster 1: Low Initial Density & Relatively Stable Prices (231 MSAs)
Cluster 2: High Initial REO Density (58 MSAs)
Cluster 3: Low Initial REO Density & Large Price Decline (69 MSAs)
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Figure 11.  Initial Estimated REO Density and Increase in REO Density among  
MSAs Clustered by Change in Value and Initial REO Density
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Many MSAs in Cluster 3 (dark solid) experienced extremely large increases in REO 
density. However, the variance in increased REO density within the cluster is quite large. 
That is, a good number of MSAs in this cluster show more moderate (but still substantial) 
increases in estimated total REO density despite large declines in their house price indices. 
This finding is consistent with Figure 1, which shows a large dispersion of REO increases 
among MSAs experiencing large property-value declines.
REO Exit by Cluster
The analysis of REO inventories thus far suggests that REO accumulation varies greatly 
across metropolitan areas. This is consistent with the fact that foreclosure rates (and therefore 
REO entrance) vary greatly across metros. However, what has been less clear is whether REO 
exit rates (primarily sales by servicers of REO properties) vary substantially across MSAs, and 
how these exit patterns may be contributing to differential rates of REO accumulation. In 
order to address this question, I examined REO exit and entrance data across the three clusters 
of MSAs described above. This was done separately for prime/near-prime vs. subprime mort-
gages. (Because there was no attempt to estimate total REO densities in this section, there was 
no need to adjust raw LPS REO numbers to arrive at estimated total REO figures.)
Figures 12 through 14 illustrate the prime/near-prime (top chart) and subprime (bottom 
chart) aggregate patterns of REO entrance and exit, together with the resulting REO accu-
mulation, for each cluster of MSAs. Again, REOs have grown appreciably in all three types 
of MSAs.
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Data sources: Lender Processing Services Inc. (LPS) Applied Analytics; Federal Housing Finance Agency
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Data sources: Lender Processing Services Inc. (LPS) Applied Analytics; Federal Housing Finance Agency
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Data sources: Lender Processing Services Inc. (LPS) Applied Analytics; Federal Housing Finance Agency
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prime/near prime - Cluster 3
prime/near prime - Cluster 2
prime/near prime - Cluster 1
subprime - Cluster 3
subprime - Cluster 2
subprime - Cluster 1
Data sources: Lender Processing Services Inc. (LPS) Applied Analytics; Federal Housing Finance Agency
The rate of increase is much faster in Cluster 3 MSAs generally, and the raw magnitude 
of the increase in Cluster 2 MSAs is generally greater than in Cluster 1 MSAs, which started at 
lower levels of REO density. These charts also show that the primary contributor to REO accu-
mulation is REO entrance, that is, newly foreclosed properties reverting to bank ownership. 
In general, REO exit rates have not increased appreciably, especially in Cluster 1 and Cluster 
2 MSAs. While REO exit rates grew slowly in Cluster 1 MSAs, these rates began from very low 
levels and have not at all kept pace with the increases in REO entrance.
REO entrance in Cluster 1 and 2 MSAs generally did not increase dramatically since 
late 2006. Cluster 2 MSAs generally saw large increases in foreclosure levels well before late 
2006 and were typically at high foreclosure levels already. However, the net surplus of REO 
entrants over exits has remained consistently substantial in both Cluster 1 and Cluster 2 
MSAs, at least in the aggregate, so that even while foreclosures did not increase dramatically 
over this period, REO accumulation continued to mount. In Cluster 3 MSAs, REO exits did 
increase some since late 2007, but this increase was slower than the increase in new REO.
The bottom charts in Figures 12 through 14 show that in the summer of 2008 there was a 
significant increase in subprime REO entrance and exit activity. The reason for this is unclear, 
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as is whether this trend continued into late 2008. The increase in exit rates was enough to 
cause a slight drop in subprime REO inventory in Cluster 2 and Cluster 3 MSAs overall. 
Figure 15 illustrates the REO exit rates for prime and subprime REO, broken out by MSA 
cluster. The exit rate is the number of REO exits in a month divided by the total inventory 
of REO in that month. There are a few patterns worth noting here. First, the subprime exit 
rates are generally more volatile from month to month than the prime/near-prime exit rates. 
This may be due in part to a greater level of tumult in the subprime market relative to the 
prime market over this period. 
Second, consistent with the patterns shown in Figures 12 through 14, the subprime exit 
rates across all three clusters showed a particular spike upward at the end of the period studied 
here. The explanation for this is unclear, but it is something worth paying close attention to 
going forward. Exit rates for prime/near-prime REO showed no such spike upward. Other 
than this late spike, subprime REO exit rates were not consistently higher or lower than 
corresponding prime/near-prime exit rates in Clusters 1 and 2, but subprime rates tended to 
be slightly higher in Cluster 3. 
Third, the exit rates of Cluster 1 REO are generally substantially higher than those for 
Cluster 2 and, especially, Cluster 3 properties. The one exception is the spiking convergence of 
exit rates late in the period. Cluster 3 REO exit rates are generally substantially slower than is 
the case for the other two clusters. This may not be surprising given the very high levels of REO 
inventory that must be absorbed in many of these markets. However, it is worth noting that, at 
the beginning of the period, the prime/near-prime REO exit rate for Cluster 3 was higher than 
that for Cluster 2 and almost as high as that of Cluster 1. Cluster 3’s prime/near-prime exit rate 
dropped from just under 12 percent to just over six percent over the study period.
Finally, in the aggregate, the prime/near-prime REO exit rate for each of the three clusters 
declined significantly over the study period. At the beginning of the period, these rates were 
in the ten percent to 14 percent range, but by the end of the period they had declined to 
a range of between six percent and 9.5 percent. This is consistent with a general pattern of 
REO entrance consistently outweighing REO exit over time.
Conclusion
This article provides a first look at REO accumulation across metropolitan areas since the 
advent of the 2007–2008 mortgage crisis. Overall, the buildup of REO properties has been 
quite steep, with the steepest REO accumulations in the formerly hot housing markets where 
foreclosures have increased most dramatically. Many of these are in the West, including 
metro areas in California, as well as Las Vegas and Phoenix. Some metro areas in Florida and 
the Washington, DC area have also seen very sharp increases in REO inventory. Metro areas 
that had relatively high levels of REO in late 2006 (at least compared to other metro areas 
at that time) have also generally seen quite substantial increases in REO densities, although 
these recent increases, while large, have not been as steep or generally as large as in the 
formerly hot-market metro areas. Moreover, four out of the five large metro areas with the 
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highest estimated REO densities as of August 2008 were formerly hot-market metro areas 
(Riverside, Las Vegas, Sacramento, and Phoenix). (The Detroit metropolitan area ranked third 
among large metro areas.)
The findings above also suggest that, although the growth of subprime REO began earlier 
during the crisis period, the estimated share of REO that is associated with subprime loans 
has generally declined in most MSAs, especially since late 2007 or early 2008. This finding is 
consistent with recent increases in prime/near-prime foreclosure rates, including among Alt-A 
and adjustable-rate loans. In many metro areas, these estimates suggest that the majority of 
REO are now associated with prime/near-prime loans. However, in particular parts of metro-
politan areas, subprime REO densities likely still dominate prime/near-prime REO densities. 
More research is needed to understand small-area patterns of REO accumulation, including 
differences in the share of REO that is associated with subprime loans. Given the existing 
evidence on the spatial concentration of subprime lending within metropolitan areas, there is 
reason to expect significant variations across neighborhoods or other submarket geographies.
The analysis of REO aging suggests that, although the metro areas that had initially 
higher REO densities in August 2006 were likely to have the highest densities of very old 
(more than twelve months) REO, some of the formerly hot markets have substantial levels of 
old (four to twelve months) REO and some even have high levels of very old REO, despite 
having only had a major foreclosure problem for just a couple of years.
Metropolitan areas appear to cluster fairly well into three groups. First is a fairly large set 
of metro areas that had modest initial REO densities and have had relatively stable price 
trends over the two-year period. This largest group of metro areas—which includes many small 
MSAs—tended to see fairly moderate increases in REO density over the two-year period. A 
second cluster of metro areas includes those that had relatively high initial REO densities. 
In general within this group, a positive relationship exists between the initial level of REO 
density and the size of the increase in REO density over the two-year period. Denver and 
Greeley, Colorado, were clear exceptions here. They both began with very high REO densi-
ties but experienced relatively moderate increases over the study period. The third cluster 
includes those metro areas that began the period with very low REO densities but saw large 
declines in property values. Many—but by no means all—of these metro areas experienced 
very large increases in REO density. Some metro areas in this group saw more moderate 
increases in REO density. 
Finally, the analysis of REO exit and entrance across the different MSA clusters shows 
that, overall, REO accumulation has been driven primarily by entering REO. In Cluster 
1 and Cluster 2 metro areas, there has been a fairly consistent and substantial surplus of 
entrants over exits, resulting in a steady rise in REO inventory. In Cluster 3 metros, fore-
closures have increased more, so that REO entrants have grown at higher rates over time. 
Although REO exits have grown some, the surplus of entrants over exits has increased, 
resulting in rapid accumulation of REO inventory. Generally, REO exit rates do not appear 
to differ substantially between prime/near-prime versus subprime REO. However, there was a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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spike in subprime REO exits at the end of the study period, but it was too brief to enable any 
strong conclusions. Overall, exit rates have been considerably lower in Cluster 3 (primarily 
the formerly hot-market metros) than in Cluster 2 and, especially, Cluster 1.
Understanding the accumulation, aging, and nature of REO inventories across metro-
politan areas is important to formulating policies and informing practice regarding how to 
help communities and neighborhoods recover from surging foreclosures. More research is 
needed to understand the corresponding intrametropolitan patterns of REO accumulation 
and aging to respond more effectively to the aftermath of the foreclosure crisis.
The findings in this article have several implications for community development policy 
and urban and regional planning. In considering such implications, it is important to keep 
in mind the fast-paced dynamics of changes in foreclosure and real estate markets in recent 
years. Cross-metro REO accumulation should be continuously monitored to inform policy 
and practice going forward.
First, at this stage of the mortgage crisis at least, it appears clear that REO accumulation 
has been quite severe not only in what had been considered weaker market metro areas but 
also in many formerly hot markets, some of which have experienced the heaviest and fastest 
increases in foreclosures over the last several years. Although this finding is most likely not 
surprising to many—especially those with local knowledge of these markets—there is little 
evidence at this point that the broader real estate market is readily absorbing REO properties 
in these formerly hot housing markets at sufficient speed to slow REO accumulation appre-
ciably. Even in places where serious increases in foreclosures began fairly recently (late 2006 
and early 2007), there are serious buildups in REO properties and, in most of these markets, 
substantial accumulations of old and very old REO. Given the earlier trends of population 
and economic growth in many of these regions, some may expect that these accumula-
tions will be worn down rapidly via “regular” market forces and the settling out of credit 
market problems. This question remains unsettled. The evidence thus far suggests that many 
formerly hot-market metro areas have accumulated very severe REO inventories. Given that 
some of the factors that contributed to escalating valuations and rapid development in these 
markets—including easy access to construction and mortgage financing and low commuting 
costs (due in part to low gasoline prices)—are unlikely to return on a long-term basis, some 
may have reason to doubt that a quick clearing of the REO supply is likely, at least in some 
of these metro areas. The scale of the foreclosure and REO problem in many of these metro 
areas may herald a longer-term spatial restructuring of some regional housing markets. This 
has implications for policymakers and planners who may be considering longer-term devel-
opment proposals, infrastructure planning, and neighborhood or local recovery efforts.
Second, because the growth in REO accumulation is driven primarily by growth in new, 
entering REO, it remains important to consider mixed strategies of slowing the inflow of 
new REO as well as encouraging the responsible and sustainable absorption of REO into 
productive use. As long as REO entrance rates remain very high, efforts aimed solely at 
REO recovery are likely to have limited impacts. In markets where the inventories have FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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reached very high levels, it is also important to consider possible land reuse, especially where 
population and economic forecasts do not suggest substantial increases in aggregate housing 
demand. 
Third, notwithstanding the need to do more work at the submetropolitan level, the shift 
in REO accumulation from subprime to prime/near-prime mortgages suggests a likely spatial 
shift in REO accumulation over time. Thus, some suburban communities that had not previ-
ously experienced major REO problems may begin to see their REO inventories increase. 
While the problems in such places are unlikely to reach the levels in many central cities or 
smaller, formerly hot-market MSAs (Modesto, Merced, Stockton), they may become serious. 
Moreover, many suburban communities have little infrastructure or experience related to 
housing or community development and may be ill equipped to deal with such problems. 
Some older-, weaker-, or stable-market cities have faced episodic challenges of vacant prop-
erty over several decades. Although these communities face serious problems with foreclosed 
properties as well, they often have somewhat of a head start in terms of an established 
community development infrastructure.
The spatial impacts of the shift toward prime/near-prime REO is not entirely clear. 
Subprime  loans  tend  to  be  more  spatially  concentrated  within  metropolitan  areas.  The 
shift toward prime/near-prime loans suggests a potential spatial dispersion of REO, which 
may reduce the negative impacts associated with heavily concentrated foreclosed proper-
ties. Moreover, the neighborhoods in which the REO properties are located may be more 
economically resilient. At the same time, many of the Alt-A and prime loans that are going 
into foreclosure are likely to be adjustable-rate loans with teaser rates and, especially in the 
case of Alt-A loans, involve significant instances of fraud or inflated incomes and investor 
properties. Some of the properties associated with such loans are likely to be heavily under-
water (where the loan balance far exceeds the property’s value), making recovery of the 
property more challenging.
A fourth implication of this study concerns the desirability and utility of having broader 
access to reliable measures of foreclosure and REO activity that are comparable across neigh-
borhoods, cities, counties, and states. The data used in this study are not generally available 
at reasonable costs for most researchers and policy analysts. Moreover, they are not entirely 
comprehensive and depend on the voluntary participation of loan servicers. Comprehensive, 
consistent, and accessible data on foreclosures and REO properties are critical to furthering 
solutions to problems of excessive foreclosures and to improving the prospects for returning 
REO to productive use. Data on loans entering foreclosure and through the REO process 
could be required from all mortgagees via federal regulations, similar to the way loan origi-
nation data are reported and disclosed via the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. Moreover, 
linking of mortgage data from HMDA through to the foreclosure and REO process would 
be particularly helpful. This would allow researchers, policy analysts, and others to more 
clearly identify the characteristics of mortgages, lenders, and borrowers associated with fore-
closures and REO properties.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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Notwithstanding the desirability of having foreclosure and REO data on residential prop-
erties available at the federal level, many states could do more to ensure better and more 
accessible data at the state and federal level. Real estate recording is generally governed by 
state law, and more transparent and accessible data could be collected and disseminated 
by states through state-level property record keeping. Currently, lower-level jurisdictions—
typically counties—collect and manage property records data, which leads to a great deal of 
variability in the quality and accessibility of the data, often making tracking REO in a large 
metropolitan area difficult.
Good data on real estate transactions can be an important tool in identifying problems 
related to foreclosures and vacant properties and in developing better policies to promote 
neighborhood and market recovery. For example, recent work by Coulton, Schramm, and 
Hirsh (2008) using an extensive data set on property transactions in Cuyahoga County, 
Ohio, show that the proportion of REO sales for under $10,000 (what they term “extremely 
distressed sales”) increased from less than 10 percent in 2006 to more than 40 percent by the 
first half of 2008. The extremely distressed sales share in the City of Cleveland increased to 
63 percent citywide, and to over 75 percent on the city’s Eastside. Such analysis is impossible 
without good, robust, local data.
The  findings  of  this  study  demonstrate  the  magnitude  of  the  challenge  that  many 
communities face in dealing with the distress caused by the ongoing foreclosure crisis. While 
many metro areas have not experienced large inventories of REO properties at this point, a 
sizable portion of them, representing a majority of mortgageable properties in metropolitan 
America, have seen large increases in the density of REO properties over a relatively brief 
period of time. Moreover, many markets, including most formerly hot housing markets, 
show little sign that the growth of REO has slowed. The shift from subprime to prime/near-
prime foreclosures may bring with it a different spatial distribution of REO. More research is 
needed to understand the neighborhood or submarket nature of REO accumulation within 
different types of metropolitan housing markets.
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Appendix
The primary data used in this article, the LPS data, are collected from loan servicers. The 
LPS data do not include all REOs. Therefore, in places where estimates of total REO prop-
erties are desired, I have derived them by multiplying the LPS unadjusted totals of prime/
near-prime and subprime REOs by factors used to scale up the LPS figures. The figures used 
for this purpose are national-level estimates of outstanding prime/near-prime and subprime 
loans from the publication National Mortgage News (NMN). Alternative estimates from the 
Mortgage Bankers Association National Delinquency Survey (NDS) were also used to judge 
the sensitivity of the findings to the use of alternative adjustment factors. The sensitivity 
analysis results (not shown here) indicate that the findings in this article are not substantially 
affected when switching to the NDS adjustments. The NMN estimates of the total market 
were somewhat larger than the NDS numbers, so those figures were chosen as the best avail-
able estimates.
By comparing LPS data to the NMN estimates, the relative extent of the LPS coverage 
of the mortgage market is estimated and adjusted for. Using these figures, the LPS figures 
are estimated to cover 58 percent of the total prime/near-prime market and 32 percent of 
the subprime market. Therefore, unadjusted LPS prime/near-prime figures are adjusted by a 
factor of 1.72 (1/0.58), and subprime figures are adjusted by a factor of 3.13 (1/0.32).
The LPS data set grew significantly in recent years. While the expansion of the data 
set was the greatest in years before 2006, the sample size continued to expand during the 
study period. Therefore, the growth in the number of loans in the data set represents not 
only growth in mortgage loan activity (or REO activity) but also the additional new loans 
entering the survey due to expanded servicer participation. Over time, many well-seasoned 
loans (loans that were not recently originated) have entered the data set in “lumpy” spurts. 
If the entrance of large numbers of well-seasoned loans is not controlled for, increased REO 
activity may merely reflect the expansion of the sample over time. At the same time, many 
newly originated loans would normally enter the data set after August 2006 even if the aggre-
gate sample (as a share of all loans) did not change. Therefore, merely restricting the REOs 
to those for loans originated by August 2006 would provide an overly conservative measure 
of REO activity and growth, especially given the poor loan performance of many loans 
originated after August 2006.
Figure A-1 shows the growth in REO in the LPS data set over time broken out into 
three categories: (1) those associated with loans that entered the data by August 2006; (2) 
those briefly seasoned (four months or less) loans that entered after August 2006; and (3) 
well-seasoned (more than four months) loans entering after August 2006. In all analyses 
involving tracking or measuring changes over time, only REO properties in groups (1) or (2) 
are included. In the cross-sectional analysis of REO as of August 2008, all three groups are 
included.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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Excluded: entered after August 2006, Seasoned > 4mos
Included: entered after August 2006, Seasoned <= 4mos
Included: entered by August 2006
 * Unadjusted counts, all loan types; all loans in MSAs
Data source: Lender Processing Services Inc. (LPS) Applied Analytics
The cluster analysis in this article uses three variables: (1) the initial (August 2006) prime/
near-prime REO density; (2) the initial (August 2006) subprime REO density; and (3) the 
percent change in OFHEO Home Price Index from the second quarter of 2006 to the second 
quarter of 2008. Squared Euclidean distance was used as the measure of proximity and Ward’s 
method, which is aimed at minimizing variance within clusters of cases. Figure A-2 illustrates 
the cluster analysis result by simplifying the initial prime/subprime REO density dimensions 
by the estimated initial total REO density variable.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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Figure A-2. Cluster Analysis Result
Data sources: Lender Processing Services Inc. (LPS) Applied Analytics, American Community Survey 2006FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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